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Abstract. This paper takes the new approach of using a copula to characterize con-
sumer preferences in a discrete choice model of product diﬀerentiation, and applies
it to the economics of monopoly and duopoly. The comparative statics of demand
strength and preference diversity, both properties of the marginal distribution of val-
ues for each product variety, are strikingly similar across market structures. Prefer-
ence dependence, a property of the copula and an indicator of product diﬀerentiation,
is a key determinant of whether prices are higher in multiproduct industries compared
to single-product monopoly. Furthermore, the eﬀects of preference on prices and prof-
its influence equilibrium product selection. Remarkably, a horizontally-diﬀerentiated
duopoly sometimes can foreclose a higher-quality monopoly to the detriment of con-
sumer and social welfare.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper develops a new framework for studying how consumer preferences deter-
mine equilibrium firm conduct and market performance in the context of monopoly
and duopoly markets. At the heart of this new framework is the copula approach
to modelling the distribution of consumer preferences in a discrete choice model of
product diﬀerentiation. This approach separates the eﬀects of the marginal distribu-
tions of consumer values for a product variety from the dependence relations between
varieties captured by a copula. Our analysis uncovers some unifying principles in the
economics of monopoly and duopoly, extending and developing new insights for eco-
nomic literatures on business strategy, product diﬀerentiation, pricing, and market
structure.
Our main model of product diﬀerentiation considers two symmetric varieties of a
good. We focus on three dimensions of consumer preferences: demand strength,
preference diversity, and preference dependence. Demand strength and preference
diversity are measured respectively by the mean () and variance () of the marginal
distribution. Preference dependence is measured by a parameter () ordering a copula
family according to conditional stochastic dominance. Loosely speaking, greater
preference dependence means that more consumers regard the two varieties as close
substitutes. Thus preference dependence is an intuitive measure of the degree of
product diﬀerentiation.
With this new approach to product diﬀerentiation, we re-examine firm conduct
and market performance in a standard discrete choice model of consumer demand.
The market can be either a monopoly or a duopoly, and each firm produces ei-
ther one or two goods. This gives rise to three possible market structures of in-
terest: single-product monopoly, horizontally-diﬀerentiated multiproduct monopoly,
and horizontally-diﬀerentiated duopoly. The strategic variables are prices, which firms
choose simultaneously under duopoly competition.
We show how demand strength and preference diversity aﬀect equilibrium price,
profit, and consumer welfare for monopoly and duopoly market structures. First,
prices, profit and consumer surplus are all higher with stronger demand. Second, firm
profits increase in preference diversity for "low-demand" products ( ≤ 0); while for
“high-demand” products (  0) profits exhibit a U-shaped relationship with , first
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decreasing and then increasing. Third, prices and consumer surplus increase in prefer-
ence diversity if  ≤ 0 or if  is suﬃciently large. These comparative-static results are
similar across all three market structures and under various dependence relations,1
providing unifying principles in the economics of monopoly and duopoly. Moreover,
the eﬀects of preference diversity on profits clarify a key result in Johnson and Myatt
(2006) for "variance-ordered distributions" for a single-product monopoly, and, un-
der general preference dependence, extend their insights to horizontally-diﬀerentiated
multiproduct monopoly and to horizontally-diﬀerentiated price-setting duopoly.2
We also consider how preference dependence aﬀects prices and profits within mar-
kets and their comparisons across markets. The standard approach to discrete-choice
models of diﬀerentiated oligopoly, pioneered by Perloﬀ and Salop (1985), typically
assumes independence between consumer values for diﬀerent varieties.3 Our analy-
sis advances the literature on product diﬀerentiation by showing that, under certain
suﬃcient conditions, both prices and profits in multiproduct industries decrease as
preferences become more positively dependent or less negatively dependent, suggest-
ing that preference dependence is a useful dimension along which to measure product
diﬀerentiation.4 We also contribute to this literature by identifying general condi-
tions comparing prices in horizontally diﬀerentiated industries with the price under
single-product monopoly. In particular, extending Chen and Riordan (2008), we find
that single-monopoly price is higher (lower) than symmetric duopoly price if the
hazard rate of the marginal distribution is non-decreasing (non-increasing) and pref-
erences are positively (negatively) dependent. In addition, we show that multiproduct
monopoly price is higher than single-product monopoly price if preferences are not
too positively dependent.
1The results require appropriate regularity conditions for each market structure. The compar-
ative statics of duopoly profits imposes the additional suﬃcient condition of an increasing hazard
rate for the marginal distriution of consumer values.
2Johnson and Myatt (2006) show insightfully that firm profit is maximized with either minimum
or maximum preference diversity for a single-product monopolist, and, under the assumption of pref-
erence independence between varieties, for a multiproduct monopoly with vertically diﬀerentiated
products and for a quantity-setting oligopoly. This has interesting implications for business strategy
in areas such as advertising, marketing, and product design.
3Anderson, dePalma, and Thisse (1992) provides an excellent overview of discrete-choice models
of product diﬀerentiation.
4As we noted above, preference diversity, the usual measure of product diﬀerentiation used in
the literature under preference independence, has non-monotonic relations with profits if   0.
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We further apply our framework to characterize equilibrium market structures in
a two-stage game, where production of each good requires a fixed cost () and two
rival firms make simultaneous product selections, choosing to produce one, both, or
neither of the goods, followed by their price decisions. Early work on the economics of
multiproduct firms considered the incentive and ability of an incumbent to use brand
proliferation to deter entry (e.g., Schmalensee, 1978; Judd, 1985), as well as the role of
cost factors such as economies of scope in giving rise to multiproduct firms (Panzar
and Willig, 1981). Shaked and Sutton (1990) directed the literature toward con-
sidering how demand may aﬀect the nature of equilibrium with multiproduct firms,
focusing especially on empirically testable relationships between market characteris-
tics and market structure. Our analysis complements and extends Shaked and Sutton
(1990) by showing how the distribution of preferences aﬀects equilibrium product se-
lections in a general discrete choice model of product diﬀerentiation. We find that
multiple products are oﬀered (either by competing firms or by a monopoly) as 
increases beyond a certain level, and that when  is large enough the duopoly equi-
librium emerges before the multiproduct monopoly equilibrium as  increases. We
further identify explicitly the roles played by preference diversity and dependence, to-
gether with fixed cost (relative to market size), in determining equilibrium outcomes.
In particular, in markets with relatively low demand (  0) multiple products are
more likely to be oﬀered when preference diversity is higher ; but in markets with
relatively high demand (  0), if  is below some critical level, multiple products
are more likely to be oﬀered when preference diversity is lower. On the other hand,
more positive (less negative) dependence makes it more likely that single-product
monopoly is the unique equilibrium and less likely that duopoly and/or multiproduct
monopoly can be an equilibrium. As in Shaked and Sutton (1990), there are parame-
ter regions where a duopoly equilibrium and a multiproduct monopoly equilibrium
coexist, suggesting that product proliferation by a monopoly sometimes can foreclose
duopoly competition, resulting in higher prices and lower consumer welfare.
Our framework can be extended to incorporate the characteristics approach to
consumer demand (Lancaster, 1966; Berry and Pakes, 2007). We illustrate this with
an extended model in which a firm can oﬀer a product that bundles the defining
characteristics of two product varieties studied in the main model. This third product
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can be viewed as a high-quality product, compared to a low-quality product with only
a single characteristic. In this extended model, we consider an additional market
structure in which monopolist oﬀers the high-quality product. Our earlier results on
how preferences aﬀect price, profit, and consumer welfare also hold for the high-quality
monopoly. More surprisingly, when firms first make simultaneous product choices
before deciding on prices, it is possible that horizontal competition between low-
quality duopolists forecloses the high-quality monopoly to the detriment of industry
profit, consumer welfare, and social welfare.
We formulate our main model in Section 2, establish the relationships between
preferences and equilibrium outcomes under various market structures in Section 3,
characterize equilibrium product selections of the two-stage game in Section 4, and
examine bundling and product selection in the extended model in Section 5. Section
6 concludes.
2. PREFERENCES
Consider two possible varieties of a good, referred to as X and Y. A consumer’s
utility for X is () and for Y is () where  and  are uniformly distributed on
[0 1]  (·) is a strictly-increasing twice-diﬀerentiable function, and there exists some
interval on which  ()  0 The consumer purchases at most one of the two varieties.
Let  denote the price of X and  the price of Y. When only one product variety is
oﬀered in the market, it will be called X and the consumer purchases it if  ()− ≥ 0
where zero is the normalized utility of an “outside good” When both varieties are
oﬀered in the market, the consumer purchases X if ()−  ≥ max{()−  0} and
Y if ()−   max{()−  0}.
The population of consumers, the size of which is normalized to 1, is described by
a symmetric copula ( ). A copula is a bivariate uniform distribution, satisfying
( 1) =  (1 ) =  and ( 0) = 0 = (0 ). Additionally, any copula, which
we assume to have strictly positive density ( ) = 2() on [0 1]2  lies between
the Frechet-Hoeﬀding lower and upper bounds:
max{0 +  − 1}  ( )  min{ } (1)
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The copula determines the statistical dependence of consumer values for the two
varieties. In particular, 1( ) ≡ () is the conditional distribution of  given ,
and 11( ) ≡ 2()2  0 ( 0) indicates positive (negative) stochastic dependence.
The independence copula is ( ) =  Positive (negative) stochastic dependence
also implies  ( )   ( ( )  )5
A family of copulas,  ( ; ), indexed by some parameter  is said to satisfy the
monotonic dependence ranking property (MDR) if for 0     1
11 ( ; )
 ≡ 11 ( ; )  0 (2)
MDR implies  ( ; ) ≡ (;)  0 (Nelson, 2006). Thus if  ( ; ) satisfies
MDR, a higher  means that  has a higher (lower) degree of positive (negative)
dependence.









[()− ]2  (4)
Let
 () =  ()−   (5)
The normalized utility  = () is assumed to have the cumulative distribution
function  () = −1(), with a corresponding density function  ()  0, on support
[(0) (1)].6 Thus  ≡ () is distributed according to  (− ) = −1();
 = () is distributed similarly. The joint distribution of  and  which is
assumed to be symmetric, is  ¡ (− )  (− )¢.7
5Positive stochastic dependence is in turn implied by positive likelihood ratio dependence or
 ln ()
  0 (Nelson, 2006).
6We extend the support in the usual way, i.e.,  () = 0 for   (0) and  () = 1 for   (1)
unless  (0) = −∞ and/or  (1) =∞
7By Sklar’s Theorem (Nelson, 2006), it is without loss of generality to represent joint distribution
of consumers’ values for two products by a copula and marginal distributions.
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Bivariate exponential case. We shall use the following parametric functions to
illustrate results:
() = − [1 + ln(1− )]  (6)
( ) =  + (1− )(1− ) (7)
In this case, the normalized utility  = () has an exponential distribution
 () = 1− −−1 (8)
with {} = 0, and  () = 1. The copula belongs to the Fairlie-Gumbel-
Morgenstern (FGM) family for which  ∈ [−1 1]. Members of the FGM family
exhibit positive stochastic dependence if   0, negative dependence if   0, and
independence if  = 0. The FGM copula density is
( ) = 1 + (2− 1)(2 − 1) (9)
The resulting bivariate exponential distribution ( ()  ()) was introduced by
Gumbel (1960).8 Our numerical analyses will focus on the extreme cases of positive
and negative dependence ( = 1 and  = −1) and independence ( = 0).9
Summarizing, the demand for the two goods is completely characterized by the
marginal distribution function  (), the copula  ( ; )  10 and parameters  and 
which respectively measure demand strength and preference diversity. The parameter
 measures the degree of preference dependence. Introduced by Chen and Riordan
(2008), the copula approach to product diﬀerentiation has the advantage of separating
the eﬀects of the marginal distribution of consumer values for each variety from
dependence relationships.
We conclude this section by placing our formulation in the context of standard
demand analysis, adopting the following normalizations
¯ = −  ; ¯ =
 − 
 ; ¯ =

  (10)
8Gumbel (1960) introduced several bivariate exponential distributions. This is the second one.
9The FGM family of copulas has limit range of positive and negative dependence; so the extreme
cases of  = 1 or  = −1 does not approximate perfectly positive or perfectly negative dependence.
10We sometimes omit  in expressing the copula function.
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If (1)  ¯  (0), and similarly for ¯, then there is a positive demand for all goods,
including the outside good, and the demand for X is calculated by integrating over
the acceptance set:
 (¯ ¯) = 1−  ( (¯)   (¯))−
1Z
 (¯)
2 ( ( () + ¯− ¯)  )  (11)
The demand for Y is calculated similarly. Thus the two goods are always substitutes
because




 ( ( () + ¯− ¯)  ; ) (( + ¯− ¯)  0
Since the cross price elasticity between the two goods is  = (¯¯;)¯ ¯(¯¯;)  in general
it is not clear that a higher  will always increase the substitutability of the two
goods (in the sense of higher ), despite  being lower with a higher . However,
if ¯ = ¯ →  (0)  then a suﬃcient condition for the two goods to become closer
substitutes as  increases is
1R
0
( ; ) ( ())  ≥ 0 (12)
This condition states that greater preference dependence is associated with greater
density of consumer preferences along the diagonal of the type space, meaning that
with greater dependence more consumers value the two goods similarly.11 We shall
return to this condition later.
If only good X is oﬀered in the market, its demand can be obtained by setting
 (¯) = 1 in (11), or
(¯) = 1−  (¯) (13)
11While this is an intuitive property, we do not know whether it is an implication of MDR. We
are not aware of any relationship established between the two conditions in the statictics literature.
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3. PRICING
We assume that the production of each good requires a constant average variable
cost normalized to zero. An appropriate interpretation of the variable cost normal-
ization is that  is a markup on variable cost, and  is mean demand net of constant
average variable cost.
We further assume that equilibrium prices exist uniquely and are interior under
all market structures.12 This, together with the symmetry of  (· ·)  implies that
equilibrium is symmetric when products are symmetric. The maintained assump-
tions simplify comparative statics and comparisons of prices, profits, and welfare for
diﬀerent market structures.
In this section, we develop the comparative statics of consumer preferences. These
results will demonstrate some unifying principles in the economics of monopoly and
duopoly, contributing to the theory of price and product diﬀerentiation, and providing
the basis for our later study of product selection,
Monopoly
First, consider a single-product monopolist, who produces X. From (10), the
monopolist’s (gross) profit function is
(¯) = (¯+ ¯) [1−  (¯)]  (14)
The profit-maximizing price satisfies
(¯ + ¯) (¯) = 1 (15)
where
 (¯) ≡  (¯)
1−  (¯) (16)
is the hazard rate. The following regularity condition guarantees a unique local
maximum.13
12That is, profit functions are diﬀerentiable at equilibrium prices. For convenience, we refer to
optimal prices under monopoly as equilibrium prices.
13Our maintained assumption of interior equilibrium requires ¯  (0) at the solution of (15).
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A1: [(¯+¯)(¯)]¯  0 where ¯+ ¯ =   0
Thus, 0() ≥ 0 a familiar assumption in the discrete choice product diﬀerentiation
literature, is suﬃcient but not necessary for A1. The maximum profit is  ≡




[1−  (¯)] ¯ (17)
Defining normalized profits and consumer surplus,  =  and  = , we
have the following result.
Proposition 1 Given A1, (i) ¯¯  0 and there exists some ¯  0 such that
¯ T 0 if ¯ S ¯; (ii) ¯¯  0; and (iii) ¯  0.
Proof. Part (i) follows immediately from (15) and A1, part (ii) follows from the
envelope theorem, and part (iii) follows from simple diﬀerentiation.
Proposition 1 predicts how single-product monopoly conduct and performance de-
pend on demand strength and product diversity, as in the following two results:
Corollary 1 Given A1: (i)  T 0 if 0 () T 0; (ii)   0; and (iii)   0







 (¯ + ¯)
¯ T 0 if 
0 () T 0
from (15) and part (i) of Proposition 1. (ii) and (iii) follow directly from parts (ii)







Therefore, profit and consumer welfare under single-product monopoly are both
increasing in demand strength, and so is monopoly price if 0 ()  0
Corollary 2 Given A1: (i) 

  0 if  is suﬃciently large for any given  if
 ≤ 0 and 0 (·) ≥ 0 or if  ≥ 0 and 0 (·) ≤ 0; (ii)   0 when  ≤ 0 and 
first decreases and then increases in  when   0; (iii)   0 if  ≤ 0 or if  is
suﬃciently large for given   0
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  0 if ¯ is suﬃciently close to zero and ¯  ¯; i.e., for any given 

  0 if  is large enough. Furthermore, from A1, 1 + ¯

¯ T 0 if 0 () T 0 Thus

  0 if  ≤ 0 and 0 () ≥ 0 or if  ≥ 0 and 0 (·) ≤ 0











 − ¯ [1−  ()] =  [1−  ()] 

  0 if  ≤ 0 For given   0   0 if   ¯   = 0 if  = ¯  and

  0 if   ¯ 








[1−  (¯)] ¯− ¯¯

¯  0
if  ≤ 0 or if  is suﬃciently large for given   0
Johnson and Myatt (2006) studied families of "variance-ordered" distributions for
which mean value is a diﬀerentiable function of variance, i.e.  = (), and showed
that  is a quasi-convex function of  if 0() ≥ 0. Part (ii) of Corollary 2 details
this result for the special case of a constant mean, i.e. 0() = 0. Johnson and Myatt
further showed that  is a convex function of  if 0() ≥ 0. Our equation (13),
however, implies that  is decreasing in ¯. Therefore, part (i) of Proposition 1
clarifies for the constant mean case that  increases with  if   0 and, conversely,
 decreases with  if   0. An important implication of Johnson andMyatt’s result
is that a single-product monopolist seeks either to maximize or minimize preference
diversity.14 Corollary 2 further clarifies that the monopolist always seeks to increase
preference diversity for a "weak demand" product for which  ≤ 0.
14Johnson and Myatt’s Proposition 1 establishes a preference for extremes for an even broader
family of distributions ordered by a decreasing sequence of "rotation" points.
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Our analysis goes further in explicitly considering consumer welfare. Corollary
2 shows that the firm’s incentive to increase  for weak-demand products coincides
with the consumer interests. Strong-demand products (  0) lack such general
coincidence of interests, because the critical  at which  switches from decreasing
to increasing in  is diﬀerent from the corresponding critical  for . Nevertheless,
if  is large enough, the firm’s incentive to further increase diversity does coincide
with consumer interests.
Next consider the multiproduct monopolist who produces both varieties of the
good. While Johnson and Myatt (2006) studied a multiproduct monopoly producing
vertically-diﬀerentiated products under independent valuations between products, the
following analysis deals with horizontal diﬀerentiation under general preference de-
pendence. Under our maintained symmetry assumption, the monopolist charges the
same price for both variants. Defining ¯ as before, the monopolist’s profit function
is
 () = (+ ) [1−  ( ()  ())]  (18)
The profit-maximizing normalized price ¯ satisfies
(¯ + ¯) (¯) = 1 (19)
where
(¯) ≡ 21( (¯)   (¯))
1− ( (¯)   (¯)) (¯) (20)
is the hazard rate corresponding to cumulative distribution function
(¯) ≡ ( (¯)   (¯))
on support [ (0)   (1)]. This distribution function determines the total demand
of a monopolist selling two symmetric goods at the same price. The corresponding
maximum profit is  ≡  =  (¯)  and consumer surplus given ¯ is
 ≡  = 
(1)Z
¯
[1−  ( (¯)   (¯))] ¯ (21)
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where  and  denote normalized values. The following regularity condition




A2 is satisfied if (¯) increases (or does not decease too quickly) in ¯
Note that the first-order condition (19) is the same as (15) for single-product
monopoly, except that the hazard rate here,  (¯)  corresponds to the cumu-
lative distribution function (¯) It follows that comparative statics with respect to
¯ are essentially the same as for a single-product monopoly.
Proposition 2 Given A2: (i) ¯

¯  0 and there exists some ¯  0 such that
¯ T 0 if ¯ S ¯; (ii) ¯  0; (iii) ¯  0.
As for the single-product case, comparative statics with respect to  and  are
straightforward corollaries, and the comparative statics on  extends some of the
basic results in Johnson and Myatt (2006) to symmetric multiproduct monopoly.
Corollary 3 Given A2: (i) 

 T 0 if 0 () T 0; (ii)   0; (iii)   0
Corollary 4 Given A2: (i) 

  0 if  is suﬃciently large for any given  if
 ≤ 0 and 0 (·) ≥ 0 or if  ≥ 0 and 0 (·) ≤ 0; (ii)   0 when  ≤ 0 
first decreases and then increases in  when   0; (iii)   0 if  ≤ 0 or if  is
suﬃciently large for given   0.
We can also investigate more generally how the degree of preference dependence
aﬀects outcomes under multiproduct monopoly. Toward this end, we consider a family
of copulas satisfying MDR, and define  (¯; ) accordingly. A useful property of
copula is that the conditional copula, 1 ( ; ) ≡ (;)  increases (decreases) in
 when  is small (large). This implies that greater positive dependence shifts up
the hazard rate for the multiproduct monopolist when the market coverage is high.
Lemma 1 Given MDR, 
(¯;)
  0 if ¯ ( (0)) is suﬃciently close to (0).
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Proof. GivenMDR, it is suﬃcient to show that there exists some 1 with 0  1 
1 such that 1 ( ; ) increases in  if   1 For any ¯  0Z  (¯)
0








 ( (¯)  (¯); )
increases in  which is possible only if there is some 1  0 such that 1 ( ; )
increases in  if   115
Furthermore, the market is fully covered, or nearly so, if demand is suﬃciently
strong. This consideration contributes to part (ii) of the following:




Proof. (i) holds from application of the envelope theorem to (18) and   0
(ii) For  (·) and  (· ·; ) satisfying A2, if ¯ is suﬃciently high, then (19) implies
¯  −1 (1) for all , where 1 is defined in the proof for Lemma 1. Therefore,
if ¯ is suﬃciently large, Lemma 1 implies (¯;)  0. It follows from (19) that
¯
  0 and hence 

  0
Therefore, a multiproduct monopolist prefers that consumer values for its two prod-
ucts are less positively (more negatively) dependent. This is intuitive, since the more
similar are product varieties the less valuable is a choice. A suﬃcient condition for
 to decrease in  is demand being suﬃciently strong (¯ suﬃciently high). It is
possible that  increases with  if demand is suﬃciently weak For example, for
the bivariate exponential case based on the FGM copula family, numerical analysis
shows that  increases in  if ¯ is below a critical value.
The eﬀects of greater preference dependence on consumer welfare appear ambiguous
in general. On the one hand, a higher  shifts down the demand curve, thus reducing
consumer surplus at any price. On the other hand, a higher  might result in a
lower price, as when demand is suﬃciently strong, which increases consumer surplus
given the demand curve. However, if more dependence leads to higher prices, as
it is sometimes the case when ¯ is low, then greater dependence reduces consumer
15Similarly, there exists 2 with 1 ≤ 2  1 such that 1 ( ; ) decreases in  if   2 For
the FGM family, 1 = 2 = 12.
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welfare. This general ambiguity persists even in the neighborhood of independence
and for strong demand. For the bivariate exponential special case, however, numerical
analysis shows that consumer welfare increases with preference dependence when
demand is suﬃciently strong.
Duopoly
Assume the two products are sold by symmetric single-product firms The profit
function of FirmX is  ( ) = (+) ( )  In equilibrium,  =  = , satisfying
¡¯ + ¯¢ ¡¯¢ = 1 (22)
where we define the adjusted hazard rate under duopoly competition as
 (¯) ≡  (¯) + 2
1−  ( (¯)   (¯))
1Z
 (¯)
 ( )  ( ())  (23)
which is the hazard rate under multiproduct monopoly adjusted by an extra term.
The extra term measures the business-stealing eﬀect when both firms charge the
same price, i.e. the percentage demand increase from a price cut resulting from
customers who change allegiance. Notice that if ¯ ≤ (0) then  (¯) = 0 and
 (¯) = 2 R 1
0
 ( )  ( ())  Thus (0) is the critical price separating the equilib-
rium regimes of fully covered versus non-fully covered markets.
To ensure unique comparative statics, we adopt the regularity condition:
A3: [(¯+¯)(¯)]¯  0
For example, 0(¯) ≥ 0 and hence A3 holds if  () is exponential and 11 ≥ 0 from
(26) in the proof of Proposition 5. However, A3 is also consistent with 0(¯)  0
and/or 11  0.
Each firm’s equilibrium profit and consumer welfare are, respectively:
 ≡ ¯ = 1
2
 ¡¯ + ¢ £1−  ¡ ¡¯¢   ¡¯¢¢¤  (24)
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 ≡ ¯ = 
(1)Z
¯
[1−  ( (¯)   (¯))] ¯ (25)
The eﬀect of demand strength and preference diversity on firm conduct and con-
sumer welfare under duopoly is qualitatively similar to monopoly. The eﬀect on
profit, however, is qualitatively similar under the suﬃcient condition of a non-decreasing
adjusted hazard rate  (·).
Proposition 4 GivenA3: (i) ¯

¯  0 and there exists some ¯  0 such that ¯ T 0
if ¯ S ¯ (ii) ¯¯  0 if 0 (·) ≥ 0. (iii) ¯¯  0.
Proof. (i) follows immediately from (22) and A3.
(ii) From (22) and A3,
(¯+¯)




 ¡¯ + ¯¢
¯ [1−  (· ·)]− 2
1 (· ·)  ¡¯¢ ¯¯  0
(iii) follows from diﬀerentiating ¯ with respect to ¯ using ¯¯  0
An increase in ¯ has the direct eﬀect of increasing demand, with a positive eﬀect
on profit; but it also has a strategic eﬀect that can potentially lower equilibrium
price  If 0 (·) ≥ 0 (¯+¯)¯ = 

¯ ≥ 0 ensuring a positive strategic eﬀect and
hence higher  As for the monopoly cases, comparative statics of  and  follow
straightforwardly:
Corollary 5 Given A3: (i) 

 T 0 if 0 () T 0; (ii)   0 if 0 (·) ≥ 0; (iii)

  0
Corollary 6 Given A3: (i)   0 if  is suﬃciently large for any given  if  ≤ 0
and 0 (·) ≥ 0 or if  ≥ 0 and 0 (·) ≤ 0 (ii) Assume 0 (·) ≥ 0 Then   0 when
 ≤ 0 and  first decreases and then increases in  when   0 (iii)   0 if
 ≤ 0 or if  is suﬃciently large for given   0
Part (ii) of Corollary 6 extends the key insight of Johnson and Myatt (2006) to
duopoly under price competition.
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We further consider how the equilibrium outcomes under duopoly competition are
aﬀected by the degree of preference dependence. It is intuitive to expect that prices
and profits decline with preference dependence, since greater preference dependence
means that more consumers regard the two varieties as close substitutes, intensifying
competition. We identify two suﬃcient conditions under which this is true:
Proposition 5 Given A2, A3 andMDR: both ¯ and  decrease in  if either (i)




() 11( ) (i.e.,  () does not decrease too
fast and is not too logconcave); or (ii) ¯ is suﬃciently large and condition (12) holds.
Proof. (i) Integrating by parts, we can rewrite
 (¯) = 2




  ( ()) −
1Z
 (¯)
11( ) ( ()) 





1 ( )  0(())(()) −
1Z
 ()
11( ) ( ()) 





1 ( ) 
0 ( ())
 ( ())  =
1Z
 (¯)
 0 ( ())
 ( ()) 
1
2











[1−  ( )] 



















11( ) ( ()) 
1−  ( (¯)   (¯)) 
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 (¯) +  0(¯)(¯)
i
 ( (¯)   (¯))
1−  ( (¯)   (¯))  0















¡¯ + ¢ ¡ ¡¯¢   ¡¯¢ ; ¢+ ¯ ¯  0
where  ¡ ¡¯¢   ¡¯¢ ; ¢  0 from (2) and ¯  0 by the envelope theorem and
by the fact that a firm’s demand increases in the other firm’s price.
(ii) The proof of Proposition 3 shows that (¯; ) increases with  if ¯ is suﬃciently
large. Therefore, fromMDR and (23), (12) implies (¯; ) increases with  if  (¯)
is suﬃciently close to zero. From (22), ¯ and also  decrease with . As in (i), it
follows that   0
To see why additional conditions are needed to ensure that prices monotonically
decrease with  we notice that while a higher  results in a lower output for a
duopolist at a symmetric equilibrium, motivating a lower price, it also aﬀects the
slope of the residual demand curve of the duopolist that can potentially give the
incentive to raise price. Suﬃcient condition (i) in Proposition 5 is satisfied if  has
limited logcurvature and  is positively dependent, or if  does not decrease too
fast and is not too logconcave. Also, recall that (12), together with demand being
suﬃciently strong ensures that the substitutability of the two products increases as
 increases, which explains suﬃcient condition (ii).
The standard discrete choice oligopoly theory of product diﬀerentiation, pioneered
by Perloﬀ and Salop (1985), typically assumes independence between values for dif-
ferent varieties. We contribute to this literature by showing that preference depen-
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dence is another useful measure of product diﬀerentiation. In fact, while profits are
U-shaped in  when   0 profits always monotonically decreases in  under multi-
product monopoly, and profits also monotonically decrease in  under duopoly for all
 when  satisfies some fairly mild restrictions
Proposition 5 suggests that two competing single-product firms have a mutual
incentive to design or promote their products so that consumer values for them are
less positively dependent or more negatively dependent. We return to this issue when
later considering the characteristics approach to product selection.
The eﬀect of more preference dependence on consumer welfare appears to be gen-
erally ambiguous, with a higher  lowering both consumer demand and equilibrium
price. In the bivariate exponential special case, however,  increases in 
Comparing Prices across Market Structures
We now compare the pricing behaviors of firms across market structures, and show
how these comparisons might relate to preference dependence.
We start with comparing the profit-maximizing price under single-product monopoly
with the equilibrium price under duopoly While Chen and Riordan (2008) finds a
suﬃcient condition for  T  when the marginal distribution is exponential (i.e.
0 (·) = 0), it has been an open question how the prices compare for arbitrary marginal
distributions, which we can now answer with the following result:
Proposition 6 Given A1 and A3: if 11  0 (positive dependence) and 0 () ≥ 0
then   ; and if 11  0 (negative dependence) and 0 () ≤ 0 then   
Proof. If 0 () ≥ 0, then, from (23) and  () = −1 ()  we have, for any ¯:
 (¯) = 21 ( (¯)   (¯))  (¯)




(1− )  ( ) (())
1− (())
1−  ( (¯)   (¯))
≥ 21 ( (¯)   (¯))  (¯)






(1− )  ( ) 
1−  ( (¯)   (¯))  (27)
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 − 11 ( )
¸

= (1− )1 ( )|1 (¯) +
1Z
 (¯)
1 ( ) −
1Z
 (¯)
(1− )11 ( ) 





(1− )11 ( ) (28)
(27) becomes
 (¯) ≥ 21 ( (¯)   (¯))  (¯)
1−  ( (¯)   (¯)) + 2
 (¯)
1−  (¯) ·
− [1−  (¯)]1 ( (¯)   (¯)) + 1−( (¯) (¯))2 −
1Z
 (¯)
(1− )11 ( ) 








(1− )11 ( ) 
1−  ( (¯)   (¯))
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
  (¯) if 11 ( )  0 (29)
Thus, from (15) and (22), using A1 and A3, we have ¯  ¯ and hence    if
0 (·) ≥ 0 and 11  0 (positive dependence).
Similarly, if 0 (·) ≤ 0 and 11  0 (negative dependence) inequalities in (27) and
(29) will be reversed, which proves  (¯)   (¯)  implying that ¯  ¯ and hence
  
Thus positive dependence and a non-decreasing hazard rate for the marginal distribu-
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tion ensures that duopoly competition lowers prices; conversely, negative dependence
and a non-increasing hazard rate ensures that competition raises prices.16
Next, we compare the price under the multiproduct monopoly with those under
single-product monopoly and under symmetric duopoly.
Proposition 7 Given A1-A3: (i) ¯  ¯ (ii)  T  if ∀¯   (0):
1Z
 (¯)
(1− ) [11 ( ) +  ( )]  T 0 (30)
In particular, (iii)    if −11 ( )   ( ) for  ∈ (0 1) (i.e., if  is not
too positively dependent); and    if −11 ( )   ( ) for  ∈ (0 1).
Proof. (i) Since  (¯)   (¯) from (23) comparing (19) and (22) leads to ¯  ¯.
(ii) Since, from (28),
1Z
 (¯)
(1− )  ( ) 













2 [1−  (¯)]1 ( (¯)   (¯))
1−  ( (¯)   (¯))
=
[1−  ( (¯)   (¯))]− 2
1Z
 (¯)
(1− )11 ( ) − 2
1Z
 (¯)
(1− )  ( ) 
1−  ( (¯)   (¯))
16Chen and Riordan (2007) and Perloﬀ, Suslow, and Sequin (1995) present more specific models






(1− ) [11 ( ) +  ( )] 
1−  ( (¯)   (¯)) S 1 iﬀ (30) holds.
The conclusion follows from comparing (15) and (19) under assumptions A1 and A2.
(iii) These are the suﬃcient conditions for (30)
Therefore,    provided that consumer values for two products are not too
positively dependent. If two products were perfectly positively dependent, we would
have  =  which suggests that some limit on the degree of positive dependence
might be needed for    While the suﬃcient condition for    is a
theoretical possibility, we have not found an example for which it holds.
Interestingly, similar considerations are at work in comparing  with  and com-
paring  with  Both comparisons are not obvious, because the introduction of a
second product can have two opposite eﬀects on price incentives for a duopolist or for
a multiproduct monopolist. The market share eﬀect is that a price increase applies to
a smaller customer base for a product when multiple products are produced, which
motivates a firm to lower price. The price sensitivity eﬀect is that the multiproduct
firm loses fewer customers from a price increase for one of the products (a duopolist
might also lose fewer customers if the introduction of a second product steepens the
firm’s residual demand curve), which motivates the firm to raise price.17 Proposition
6 gives suﬃcient conditions under which    and vice versa, revealing the critical
roles played by preference dependence (together with the hazard rate of the marginal
distribution). On the other hand, the suﬃcient condition comparing  and  in
Proposition 7 is entirely determined by the dependence property of the copula.18
Although preference dependence and the number of firms are rather diﬀerent eco-
nomic concepts, our analysis reveals a common theme between their eﬀects on equi-
librium prices. Both more preference dependence and more firms are in a sense
increasing competition. Each has a market share eﬀect–lower output– that favors
lower prices, but each may also have a price sensitivity eﬀect–potentially steepening
17See Chen and Riordan (2008) for a more general discussion of these two eﬀects in comparing a
symmetric duopoly with a single-product monopoly.
18The comparions of  and  is more obvious and reflects the familiar intuition that a mul-
tiproduct internalizes the externalities between products (so the businee stealing eﬀect arises under
duopoly but not under monopoly).
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the residual demand curve–that favors higher prices. Propositions 6 and 5 give the
respective suﬃcient conditions that the net eﬀect is to lower prices.
Numerical analysis
We now use the FGM-exponential case (so  (·) is loglinear and  () is a con-
stant) to further illustrate the patterns of comparative statics and the comparisons
of conduct and performance across markets.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Figures 1 shows how normalized price (¯) vary with preferences and across markets
for the FGM-exponential case. There are three panels, corresponding to negative
dependence ( = −1) independence ( = 0), and positive dependence ( = 1). The
horizontal axis in each graph is measured with respect to , the profit-maximizing
single-product monopoly market share. From (15) and A1, there is a positive
monotonic relationship between  and ¯; consequently, the graphs eﬀectively de-
scribe how industry outcomes vary with normalized mean demand ¯ over the relevant
range.19
Confirming our analytical results, we observe: (1) ¯ decrease with ¯ under all three
market structures. (2) ¯ decreases in ; and while Proposition 3 predicts that 
decreases in  for  suﬃciently large, a numerical analysis (not shown) goes further,
finding that  decreases in  for ¯ above a critical value but increases in  for ¯
below. (3) ¯ is always the highest, whereas ¯  ¯ for  = 1 but ¯  ¯ for
 = −1.
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here]
Figure 2 and Figure 3 conduct the same exercises for normalized profit (¯) and
consumer welfare (¯). Again confirming our analytical results, we observe: (1) ¯
and ¯ increase with ¯ under all three market structures.20 (2) ¯ and ¯ decrease
as  increases. A numerical analysis (not shown) also confirms that the eﬀects of 
19In this case, ¯ = 1−  and  = −(2−).
20Since    when  = −1, the market is fully covered in duopoly when   1 but suﬃciently
high. In this range,  is flat.
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on consumer welfare is ambiguous: ¯ is decreasing in  except for large values
of ¯, in which case greater positive dependence can deliver more consumer welfare
than independence because price is lower. (3) Not surprisingly, ¯  ¯  ¯
On the other hand, duopoly competition creates the most consumer welfare, but a
multiproduct monopoly creates more consumer welfare than single-product monopoly
except when demand is high.21
4. MARKET STRUCTURE
Now we study how preferences aﬀect equilibrium market structure (product selec-
tion), assuming that there is a fixed cost  of introducing a product.22 Consider a
two stage game in which, in stage one, two firms simultaneously decide whether or
not to incur  for each of the two products, and, in stage two, firms simultaneously
set prices for active products. Obviously, there is no pure strategy subgame perfect
equilibrium in which both firms produce the same variety. Thus, depending on stage
one choices, the possible market structures are single-product monopoly, multiprod-
uct monopoly, and duopoly. Equilibrium prices and profits at the second stage are
as discussed in Section 3.
Product choices at the first stage depend on profit comparisons at the second stage.
Thus the following preliminary result is useful:
Lemma 2       2 and 2 ≤ 
Proof. The upper bound in (1) implies
 = max (+ ¯) [1−  ()]  max¯ (+ ¯) [1−  ( ()   ())] = 

21This last qualification is because the higher price of a multiproduct monopoly ineﬃciently reduces
the quantity demand. Even then, however, total welfare clearly is higher under multiproduct
monopoly because the widening profit gap oﬀsets the consumer surplus loss.
22The analysis here follows closely Shaked and Sutton (1990), which we shall discuss in detail
shortly.
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The lower bound in (1) implies
 = max (+ ¯) [1−  ( ()   ())]  max (+ ¯) [1− (2 ()− 1)]





( + ¯) £1−  ¡ ¡¢   ¡¢¢¤ ≤ 1
2
  
Shaked and Sutton (1990) insightfully characterized how equilibrium product se-
lection depends on an "expansion eﬀect", measured by − , and a "competition
eﬀect", measured by −2
2 . Figure 4 adapts a diagram in Shaked and Sutton
(1990) to summarize how equilibrium market structure depends on these two eﬀects,
both of which are positive from the above lemma The diagram assumes an interme-
diate level of fixed cost satisfying 1
2
    . Single-product monopoly is the
unique equilibrium if the expansion eﬀect is suﬃciently weak given the competition
eﬀect. Further, both duopoly and multimarket monopoly are equilibria if the ex-
pansion eﬀect is suﬃciently strong. Otherwise, duopoly (multimarket monopoly) is
the unique equilibrium, if the competition eﬀect is weak (strong). Notice that with
multiple equilibria, if A2 and A3 are satisfied, then    from Proposition 4
and consumer welfare is higher under duopoly.
Insert Figure 4 about here
Shaked and Sutton (1990) observed that a decrease in  shifts down the two loci
( =  and  −  = ) which divide the four equilibrium regimes in Figure 4,
and, from this, deduced how determined equilibria outcomes. The next proposition
restates their results, which follow from best responses at the product selection stage.
Proposition 8 (Shaked and Sutton, 1990) There exist non-empty sets of  ≥
0 such that: (i) single-product monopoly is the unique equilibrium if and only if
max
©  − ª   ≤ ; (ii) duopoly is an equilibrium if and only if  ≤
; (iii) multiproduct monopoly is an equilibrium if and only if  ≤  − ;
and (iv) both duopoly and multiproduct monopoly are equilibria if and only if  ≤
25
min
©  − ª 23
Our framework enables an analysis of how the distribution of preferences determines
equilibrium market structure, providing results that complement and extend Shaked
and Sutton (1990). The next set of results consider the preference parameters of
the marginal distribution; they are straightforward implication of Corollaries 1-6 and
Proposition 8. The corollary below states how equilibrium market structures vary
with demand strength, similarly as in Shaked and Sutton (1990).
Corollary 7 AssumeA1,A2, and 0 (·) ≥ 0. There exist an intermediate range of 
and critical values 1 1  and 1  with 1  min{1 1 } such that: (i) single-
product monopoly is the unique equilibrium if and only if min
©1 1 ª    1 ;
(ii) duopoly is an equilibrium if and only if  ≥ 1; (iii) multiproduct monopoly is an
equilibrium if and only if  ≥ 1 ; and (iv) both duopoly and multiproduct monopoly
are equilibrium market structures if and only if  ≥ max©1 1 ª, in which case
consumer welfare is higher under duopoly
The next corollary further clarifies how preference diversity aﬀects market structure
for given .
Corollary 8 Assume A1,A2, and 0 (·) ≥ 0. (i) if   0 or if   0 and  is
large enough then the range of  values supporting duopoly equilibrium and/or mul-
tiproduct monopoly equilibrium expands as  increases; (ii) if   0 but  is small
enough then the range of  values supporting duopoly equilibrium and/or multiprod-
uct monopoly equilibrium expands as  decreases.
Therefore, in markets with relatively low demand (  0) multiple products
are more likely to be oﬀered (by multiple single-product firms or by multiproduct
monopoly) when preference diversity is higher ; but in markets with relatively higher
demand (  0) if  is below some critical value, multiple products are more likely
to be oﬀered when preference diversity is lower.
The possibility of multiple equilibria suggests that multiproduct monopoly might
foreclose a duopoly that delivers lower prices and greater consumer welfare. Put
23All the relations in this proposition can be equivalently expressed as relations between ¯ and
¯ ¯ ¯ if we normalize  to ¯ ≡ 
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another way, if  ≤ min©  − ª, then a policy that prohibited a monopolist
from oﬀering multiple varieties would destroy an unwanted multiproduct monopoly
equilibrium and allow a superior duopoly equilibrium.24 Some care must be taken
with this policy prescription. For if    ≤  − , then a prohibition of
multimarket equilibrium would result only in an inferior single-product monopoly.
Therefore, it is for important policy reasons to know when −  , a suﬃcient
condition of which is given in the result below, which strengthens the equilibrium
characterization:
Proposition 9 Assume A1,A2, and 0 (·) ≥ 0 If ¯ is suﬃciently large, then −
   and: (i) single-product monopoly is the unique equilibrium if and only if
    ; (ii) duopoly is the unique equilibrium if and only if  −  
  ; (iii) both duopoly and multiproduct monopoly are equilibria if and only if
 ≤  − 
Proof. If ¯ is suﬃciently large  can be made arbitrarily close to  (0) and hence
 −  =  {( + ¯) [1−  ( ()   ())]− ( + ¯) [1−  ()]}
≤  (¯ + ¯) [ ()−  ( ()   ())]→ 0;
but  = 1
2
 ¡¯ + ¢ £1−  ¡ ¡¯¢   ¡¯¢¢¤ is bounded above zero as  →  (0) 
Thus  −    if ¯ is suﬃciently large. (i)-(iii) then follow from Proposition
8.
Thus, when  is large enough so that ¯ is also suﬃciently large (which is needed to
ensure  ≥ ) as ¯ increases, duopoly emerges as equilibrium before multiproduct
monopoly does.
We further consider how preference dependence aﬀects the equilibrium product se-
lection, holding the marginal distribution constant. The result below follows straight-
forwardly from Propositions 3, 5, and 8:
Corollary 9 Given A2, A3, and MDR: (i) the range of  values supporting mul-
tiproduct monopoly equilibrium contracts as  increases; (ii) if  () does not decrease
24This conclusion is reminiscent of Schmalensee (1978)’s argument that product proliferation by
a monopolist can deter entry.
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too fast and is not too logconcave, or if ¯ is suﬃciently large and condition (12) holds,
then, as  increases the range of  values supporting duopoly equilibrium also con-
tracts, but the range of  values supporting single-product monopoly as the unique
equilibrium expands.
Therefore, with certain qualifications, multiple products are more likely to be avail-
able in markets when their values are more negatively dependent (or less positively
dependent).
Johnson and Myatt (2006) has suggested that there are empirically observable ways
with which firms can influence consumers’ preference diversity. Their logic may be
extended to preference dependence, and the business strategies that they suggest
may also aﬀect consumer preference dependence. By providing a complete character-
ization of how market outcomes depend on consumer preference, in terms of mean
value for each variety, preference diversity, and preference dependence, our theory of
equilibrium product selection connects Shaked and Sutton (1990) with Johnson and
Myatt (2006), extending their insights and oﬀering new theoretical predictions. Our
analysis in Section 3 suggests that a single-product monopolist has an incentive (i)
to increase ; and, (ii) to increase  if  ≤ 0 or if   0 and  is large enough, but to
reduce  if   0 and  is small enough. With endogenous product selection, how-
ever, a higher ¯ may switch the equilibrium from single-product monopoly to duopoly
equilibrium, which reduces the firm’s profit.25 Thus the firm may seek neither to
maximize or minimize  when an extreme-seeking strategy would change equilibrium
from monopoly to duopoly.
Figure 5 continues our analysis of the bivariate exponential special case with graphs
that indicate certain critical normalized fixed costs (¯ = ) for product selection.
As before, graphs for negative and positive dependence correspond to the extremes
of the FGM family,  = −1 and  = 1 If ¯ ≤ , then duopoly is an equilibrium. If
¯ ≤ ¯− ¯, then multiproduct monopoly is also an equilibrium. If  ≥ ¯  
, then single-product monopoly is a unique equilibrium; and if ¯ ≥ ¯  ¯ − ¯
then duopoly is a unique equilibrium. Finally, for ¯ − ¯ ≥ ¯, duopoly and
multiproduct monopoly coexist as equilibria, and prices are lower and consumers are
better oﬀ with duopoly, as shown in Figure 1.
25This assumes that another firm will be able to produce a symmetric product with the same ¯.
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Insert Figure 5 about here
The single-product monopoly share is an increasing function of normalized de-
mand strength (¯). Therefore reading the diagrams in Figure 5 from left to right
indicates how increasing demand strength changes the structure of equilibrium for
the bivariate exponential case. When ¯ is low, equilibrium market structure shifts
from no production, to single-product monopoly, to duopoly, to multiple equilibria
as demand strength increases. Thus duopoly equilibrium always emerges before the
multiproduct monopoly equilibrium as ¯ increases. For intermediate ¯, there is a
non-monotonicity; when demand strength becomes suﬃciently great, multiple equi-
libria give way to a unique duopoly equilibrium. For higher ¯, the multiproduct
monopoly becomes impossible for any relevant ¯, and for even higher ¯ so does the
duopoly equilibrium. These conclusions hold over the entire range of preference de-
pendence for the bivariate exponential case.26 Furthermore, comparing the three
panels, positive (negative) dependence decreases (increases) the range of ¯ support-
ing multiproduct market structures.
5. BUNDLING
We now consider an extended model in which a firm can oﬀer a high-quality prod-
uct that combines the features of the two product varieties discussed in the previous
sections. We suppose that the two varieties are distinguished by product character-
istics X and Y, and interpret () and () as a consumer’s willingness to pay for
these characteristics.27 We interpret the outside good as a competitively-supplied
basic product providing consumers a net value of , and interpret varieties X and Y
as enhanced goods providing values  + () and  + () respectively. A high-
quality product that bundles both characteristics provides value  + () + ()28
26Shaked and Sutton (1990) showed in a linear-demand representative consumer model similarly
that a multimarket equilibrium is never a unique equilbrium.
27The characteristics approach to demand goes back to Lancaster (1971). Our formulation here
follows more directly Berry and Pakes (2007).
28For example, the basic good is a computer with X and Y being two application software; the
basic good is cable or Satellight TV subscription with X and Y being two diﬀerent sets of programs;
and the basic good is a vacation trip with X and Y being diﬀerent sets of activities that can be
included in the package.
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We maintain the assumption that each consumer buys only one of these products,29
and normalize constant average variable costs to zero.30 For convenience, we further
normalize  = 0.
There are two additional relevant market structures in this extended model: a
monopolist oﬀering a high-quality product that bundles both characteristics, and a
vertically diﬀerentiated market where one firm oﬀers the high-quality product while
another firm oﬀers a low-quality product with only one characteristic.31 We shall
focus on the analysis of monopoly bundling, but will also consider firm profits in the
vertically diﬀerentiated market when discussing equilibrium product selection.
Comparative Statics under Monopoly Bundling
For a monopolist who only oﬀers the bundle at price , a consumer will purchase
if and only if  () + () ≥  or −1 () + −1 () ≥ −2  Thus, letting ˜ ≡ −2 















 ( )   ˜   (1) +  (0)
(31)
Notice that  (¯) is continuous at ˜ =  (1) +  (0)  The monopolist’s profit from
the bundle is  (˜) =  (˜+ 2¯)  (˜). The optimal monopoly price ˜ which is
assumed to be interior, satisfies
(˜+ 2¯) (˜) = 1 (32)
29Suppose that consumers value the basic good at  +  which has a competitive price  Then
surplus from purchasing both X and Y at prices  and  is ++()+()−−. With  ≥  and
 ≥ , the consumer surplus from purchasing both varieties is bounded above by +(1)+(1)−,
which is negative if  is suﬃciently large.
30Put another way,  is the common consumer value of the outside good net of its constant average
variable cost, and  and  are the prices of the characteristics net of their constant average variable
cost.
31We consider only pure bundling. Mixed bundling can be ruled out if the fixed cost to oﬀer a
single-characteristic good is high enough.
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where




˜  0 (33)
plays a similar role as hazard rate  (¯) under the single-product monopoly, with  (˜)
being the price elasticity of demand.




A suﬃcient condition for A4 is that  (˜) increases in ˜ Notice that since  (˜)
decreases in ˜  (˜) increases in ˜ if  (˜) is not too convex, similar to the require-
ment under single-product monopoly that  (·) does not decrease too fast so that  (·)
increases. At the optimal bundle price, the firm’s profit is  ≡ ¯ ≡  ¡˜¢  and
consumer welfare is
 ≡  = 
2(1)Z
˜
 (˜) ˜ (34)
Extending how ¯ aﬀects market outcomes under single-product monopoly and notic-
ing from (31) that 
(˜)
¯  0 we obtain:
Proposition 10 Given A4: (i) ˜

¯  0 and there exists some ¯  0 such that
˜ T 0 if ¯ S ¯; (ii) ¯¯  0; (iii) ¯¯  0.
Similar to the single-product case, comparative statics with respect to  and  are
straightforward corollaries, and the comparative statics for  extends some of the
basic results in Johnson and Myatt (2006) to a monopoly oﬀering a bundle.
Corollary 10 Given A4: for any given : (i)  R 0 if 0 () R 0; (ii)   0;
(iii)   0
Corollary 11 Given A4: (i)   0 if  is suﬃciently large for any given  if
 ≤ 0 and 0 (·) ≥ 0 or if  ≥ 0 and 0 (·) ≤ 0 (ii)   0 when  ≤ 0; and 
first decreases and then increases in  when   0 (iii)   0 either when  ≤ 0
or when  is suﬃciently large for given   0
We can also gain some insights on how preference dependence aﬀects demand and
profits under monopoly bundling. In the copula unit square on which  ( ) is
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defined, the area below the  () +  () = ˜ curve contains the square formed by
 =  (˜2) =  which increases with  by MDR. The probability mass in the
area below the  () +  () = ˜ curve is clearly higher when  is close to being
perfectly dependent than when  is independent. Thus  (˜) and  tend to be
lower when preferences are highly dependent than when they are independent. More
generally, if ¯ is relatively high (so that ˜ is much lower than  (1) +  (0)), more
positive dependence tends to increase the probability mass below the curve defined by
 () +  () = ˜ in the copula unit square, lowering  (˜) and  For our bivariate
exponential example, numerical analysis indicates that  decreases in .
Product Selection
We further consider the issue of endogenous market structure, in a two stage game
similarly as in Section 4. Notice that a high-quality firm will incur fixed cost 2
for producing the bundled product with two characteristics. It is useful to compare
 with profits under other market structures. Since      we focus on
finding the suﬃcient conditions for    or   :
Proposition 11    if  ≥ 0 or if  is suﬃciently positively dependent;
   if  ( 0) is suﬃciently small and  is suﬃciently negatively dependent.
Proof. First, for any given   0 such that  (¯) ≥ 0 we have  (¯)   (¯)
because the curve  () +  () =  (¯) in the copula unit square is inside the square
formed by  =  (¯) =  Thus, if ¯ ≥ 0 since ˜ = ¯− ¯ we have
 =  ¡˜¢ ≥  (¯)   (¯) = 
Next, if  (· ·; ) = min { }  we would have Pr ( =  ) = 1 Hence, for any given
  0 such that  (¯) ≥ 0




  (2¯)→  (¯) as  ( )→ min { } 
It follows that    if  is suﬃciently positively dependent.
Finally, if  (· ·; ) = max {0 +  − 1}  we would have Pr ( +  = 1) =
1 Hence, if  is suﬃciently negatively dependent, we would have  +  → 1 in
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probability Hence, if in addition   0 is suﬃciently small, for almost all  and
 that satisfy the dependence relationship we would have  () +  () ≤ 0  or
 () +  () ≤ ˜ even if  = 0 implying that  → 0   where  is bounded
above 0 when  is suﬃciently negatively dependent
Thus, pure bundling does poorly when  is low and preferences are highly negatively
dependent. In our bivariate exponential example, pure bundling does poorly when 
is low even if preferences are independent.
Let  and  denote respectively the equilibrium profits of the high-quality firm
and the low-quality firm under vertical diﬀerentiation; their normalized values are
respectively ¯ =  and ¯ = . Since the presence of the low-quality
product reduces demand for the high-quality product (the bundle), we have   
Also, since the presence of the bundle reduces the demand for a single product,
we have    Moreover, it can be shown that    ; that is, if adding a
second characteristic has no additional cost, then a firm in a horizontally diﬀerentiated
market with a single-characteristic product always has the incentive to add the second
characteristic.
Insert Figure 6 about here
Figure 6 contains three panels drawn for the independent bivariate exponential case
for normalized values. Panel (a) graphs critical fixed costs. When ¯ is high enough,
the curves can be ranked as follows: The highest curve, labelled −, is the diﬀer-
ence in profit between a high-quality monopolist, who bundles both characteristics,
and a low-quality monopolist who oﬀers only one characteristic. The next three solid
lines, labeled ¯ ¯ and − ¯, are respectively the profit of a monopolist with
a single low-quality product, the profit of a horizontally diﬀerentiated low-quality
duopolist, and the diﬀerence in profits between a multiproduct monopolist with two
horizontally diﬀerentiated low-quality products and a monopolist with a single low-
quality product. The higher unlabeled dashed line is ¯− ¯, the diﬀerence in profits
between the high-quality firm under vertical diﬀerentiation and a horizontally diﬀer-
entiated low-quality duopolist; and the lower unlabeled dashed line is ¯, the profit
of a low-quality vertically diﬀerentiated duopolist. Thus, bundled monopoly is an
equilibrium if − ¯ ≥ max { − ¯}, while horizontal duopoly is an equi-
librium if ¯ ≥  and ¯ − ¯   Notice that for an intermediate range
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of monopoly market share (i.e. intermediate values of ¯) both monopoly bundling
and symmetric duopoly are equilibrium market structures. However, in some of this
intermediate region, panel (b) shows that consumer welfare is higher under monopoly
bundling than under horizontal duopoly, and panel (c) further shows that industry
profit is higher under monopoly bundling than duopoly unless demand is low. Nu-
merical analyses for cases of positive and negative dependence are similar. We thus
have:
Proposition 12 In the bivariate exponential example, for ¯ suﬃciently large there
exist an intermediate range of  for which a high-quality monopoly and horizontally-
diﬀerentiated low-quality duopoly are both equilibria, with both consumer welfare and
industry profit being higher under the monopoly
Surprisingly, a horizontal duopoly can foreclose a more eﬃcient monopoly produc-
ing a high-quality product that bundles characteristics. This possibility result con-
trasts with our earlier finding that a horizontal-multiproduct monopoly can foreclose
a more eﬃcient horizontal duopoly. Together, these two results illustrate the sub-
tleties of sound antitrust enforcement of horizontal mergers when product selection
is endogenous.
6. CONCLUSION
Using copulas to describe the distribution of consumer preferences is a convenient
and intuitive approach to product diﬀerentiation in discrete choice models of consumer
demand. The approach leads to several sets of conclusions about how preferences
matter for industrial organization. First, with certain qualifications, prices, profits,
and consumer welfare all increase in demand strength, and they also all increase in
preference diversity if  ≤ 0 or if  is suﬃciently high; but profit first decreases and
then increases in preference diversity if   0. These comparative statics are robust
to varying degrees of preference dependence across monopoly and duopoly market
structures, providing unifying principles in the economics of monopoly and duopoly.
Second, under certain conditions greater dependence leads to more product diﬀeren-
tiation in multiproduct industries, in the sense of lower prices and profits. Third,
for an initially monopolized market, the entry of a competitor with a horizontally
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diﬀerentiated product lowers market price if preferences are positively dependent and
the hazard rate of the marginal distribution is non-decreasing, but raises price under
negative dependence and a non-increasing hazard rate. Fourth, when market struc-
tures are endogenous, multiproduct industries are more likely to emerge as demand
strength increases, as preference diversity increases if  ≤ 0 or if  is high enough, and
as preferences become less positively dependent. Fifth, when product characteristics
are endogenous, it is possible that the exclusion or acquisition of a horizontally dif-
ferentiated rival leads to a high-quality monopoly that improves consumer and social
welfare.
For future research, it would be desirable to extend our analysis to oligopoly mar-
kets with arbitrary numbers of firms and product varieties. The copula approach
could also provide a convenient framework to study product bundling in a general
setting, allowing mixed bundling and general preference dependence relations.32 Our
framework can also be applied to other areas of microeconomics, such as the eco-
nomics of search (e.g., Anderson and Renault 1999; Schultz and Stahl 1996) and the
economic analysis of horizontal mergers. Furthermore, the copula approach and the
rich set of predictions our analysis has generated, concerning how market character-
istics aﬀect prices, profits, consumer surplus, and market structures, might open up
interesting new directions for empirical industrial organization research.
32It would be interesting to consider the situation where some consumers may want to purchase
both products, as in McAfee, McMillian, and Whinston (1989), which also allows preference de-
pendence. Product bundling when consumer values for two products are correlated have also been
studied, for example, in Schmalensee (1984), Nalebuﬀ (2004), and Armstrong and Vickers (2008).
35
REFERENCES
Anderson, S.P., A. de Palma, and J-F Thisse. Discrete Choice Theory of Product
Diﬀerentiation. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992.
Armstrong, Mark and John Vickers, “Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Bundling”,
2008, working paper.
Anderson, S.P. and R. Renault. "Pricing, Product Diversity, and Search Costs: A
Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond Model." RAND Journal of Economics 1999, 30(4),
719-35.
Armstrong, M. and J. Vickers, “Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Bundling”, 2008,
working paper.
Berry, S. and A. Pakes. “The Pure Characteristics Demand Model.” International
Economics Review, 2007, 48(4), Special Issue Economics to Econometrics: Contribu-
tions in Honor of Daniel L. McFadden, Charles F. Manski and Whitney Newey, eds.,
pp. 1193-1225.
Chen, Y. and M.H. Riordan. “Price-increasing Competition." RAND Journal of
Economics, 2008, 39(4), pp.1042-1058.
__________. “Price and Variety in the Spokes Model." Economic Journal,
2007, 117 (522), 897-921.
Joe, H. Multivariate Models and Dependence Concepts. London: Chapman and Hall,
1997.
Johnson, J.P. and D.P. Myatt. “On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing,
and Product Design.” American Economic Review, 2006, 96(3), pp. 756-784.
Judd, K.L. “Credible Spatial Preemption.”RAND Journal of Economics, 1985, 16(2),
pp. 153-166.
Lancaster, K.J. “A New Approach to Consumer Theory.” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 1966, 74(2), pp. 132-157.
McAfee, R. P., J. McMillan, and M.D. Whinston. “Multiproduct Monopoly, Com-
modity Bundling, and Correlation of Values.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1989,
104(2), pp. 371-383.
36
Nelsen, R.B. An Introduction to Copulas. New York: Springer, 2006.
Nalebuﬀ, B. "Bundling as an Entry Barrier." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004,
119(1), pp. 159-87.
Patton, A.J. “Copula-Based Models for Financial Time Series." Oxford Financial
Center Economics Series, #2008fe21, Oxford University, 2008.
Panzar, J. and R.D. Willig. “Economies of Scope."American Economic Review, 1981,
71, pp. 268-272.
Perloﬀ, J.M. and S.C. Salop. “Equilibrium with Product Diﬀerentiation." Review of
Economic Studies, 1985, pp. 107-120.
Perloﬀ, J.M., V.Y. Suslow, and P.M. Seguin. "Higher Prices from Entry: Pricing of
Brand-name Drugs." W.P. No. CPC-99-03, Competition Policy Center, University of
California at Berkeley, 1995.
Schmalensee, R. "Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry."
Bell Journal of Economics, 1978, 9, pp. 305-327.
Schmalensee, R. “Gaussian Demand and Commodity Bundling.” Journal of Business,
1984, 57, pp. 58-73.
Schultz, N. and K. Stahl. "Do Consumers Search for Higher Price? Oligopoly Equilib-
rium and Monopoly Optimum in Diﬀerentiated-Products Markets." RAND Journal
of Economics, 1996, 27(3), pp. 542-62.
Shaked, A. and J. Sutton, “Multiproduct Firms and Market Structure.” RAND Jour-
nal of Economics, 1990, 21(1), pp. 45-62.
37
Figure 1




















































































































































Competition  2mm d   
m 
Effect 2 d  
Figure 5



























































B m  Bw dw
B
mm
1.5 1.51.5
m
d
2 d
0.75 0.750.75
mmw
mm m 

mmw
Monopoly Market Share (qm)
0 0.5 1
0
0 0.5 1
0
0 0.5 1
0
